# CERT-FR: Most App Data Breaches It Handled Needed No Flaw, Some Only an Old Account

_CERT-FR, the French government's computer emergency response team, published a report on data breaches in web applications on October 20, 2026. In most of the breaches it handled in recent years, attackers needed no software flaw. Some involved former staff using accounts that were not revoked._

By Johannes Keienburg, CEO & Founder  
Published: 2026-10-22  
Source: https://www.cakewalk.security/blog/cert-fr-app-data-breaches-valid-accounts

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## Attackers Got In Without Exploiting a Software Flaw

France's national cybersecurity agency, ANSSI, published a report on data breaches in web applications on October 20, 2026. The report comes from CERT-FR, the agency's computer emergency response team, and draws on the incidents CERT-FR has helped victims through. CERT-FR says no software flaw was needed in most of the web application breaches it has handled in recent years. Attackers reused legitimate credentials, got in through social engineering or found data exposed with no [access control](/glossary/access-control) at all. CERT-FR was informed of 196 incidents involving [data exfiltration](/glossary/data-exfiltration) in 2025, after handling 130 in 2024. The report's recommendations for existing applications include who should hold an account and what that account may access.

> Many organizations underestimate the risks of malicious use of legitimate credentials, when attackers obtain login and password pairs.

_CERT-FR, Violations de données applicatives, Retour d'expérience du CERT-FR, October 20, 2026 (translated from French)_

In May 2025 an attacker took over one user account at an e-health provider and used it to query an API on the provider's database. Some breaches ran through a contractor. A medical laboratory had test results exfiltrated after attackers compromised the account of the contractor that managed the laboratory's results viewer.

## Some Accounts Stayed Open After Their Holders Left

In several recent incidents, insiders with legitimate accounts disclosed data without authorization. In some cases, people who had left the organization used accounts that were not revoked after their departure. A U.S. health regulator raised the same problem in September, [listing a missing procedure for ending departing workers' access](/blog/hipaa-ambry-genetics-access-termination-settlement) as a potential violation of [HIPAA](/glossary/hipaa), the U.S. health privacy law. The report's second principle, minimizing user access, includes managing each account's lifecycle. Every account must be tied to a person or an entity, shared accounts are ruled out and [access needs are reviewed](/glossary/access-review) when the account holder's role changes. An account left unused for a period that fits the business should be detected and disabled, whether in the application, in the directory or at the [identity provider](/glossary/identity-provider) during sign-in.

> A periodic review process must make it possible to ensure that only legitimate accounts are active on the application.

_CERT-FR, Violations de données applicatives, Retour d'expérience du CERT-FR, October 20, 2026 (translated from French)_

[Least privilege](/glossary/least-privilege) applies to the data itself. Users should get only the access their duties require, granted through business groups. A user who belongs to no group must not be able to access the data. Request rates should be capped too, with separate limits for interactive users, third-party applications, desktop clients and even AI agents. Unless a regulation requires otherwise, CERT-FR says the recommendations are not normative. They are meant to raise the security of existing applications until those applications are replaced.

> An account that still works after its owner left is an access decision nobody went back to. In Cakewalk, a departure recorded in the HR system opens an offboarding task that raises removal requests for the apps a company manages there. Rate limits and sign-in rules belong to the application and the systems in front of it, outside what Cakewalk does.

_Comment from Gil Röder, CPO & Co-Founder_

Source: CERT-FR, ANSSI, [Violations de données applicatives, Retour d'expérience du CERT-FR](https://cert.cyber.gouv.fr/cti/CERTFR-2026-CTI-008/) (CERTFR-2026-CTI-008), October 20, 2026.
