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Qubole's AWS Credentials Opened Access to Customer Accounts, Mostly Through Unused Roles

Johannes KeienburgJohannes Keienburg, CEO & Founder
Published November 12, 2026
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1An Attacker Read Secrets and Downloaded Data Through Vendor Access Customers Had Not Removed

Between October 14 and 26, 2026, an attacker used credentials from an AWS account behind the Qubole data platform to take on cross-account roles in customer AWS accounts. The cloud security company Wiz reported the activity on November 9. Companies that connect Qubole to Amazon Web Services typically create such a role, a role inside their own account that Qubole's account may take on. A trust policy names who may take the role on and usually requires an External ID, a value the vendor sends when it requests the role. Wiz says most of the roles the attacker took on showed no other use, while their trust policies stayed in place. Each of these roles is a non-human identity that one vendor account can take on across many customers.

Every AssumeRole request we attributed to the threat actor included an External ID, and every one succeeded.

Wiz, Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild, November 9, 2026

The credentials belonged to two Identity and Access Management (IAM) users in that account, one of which also carries Qubole's legitimate platform traffic. Inside each customer account, the attacker listed what the role could see and then read the services where AWS accounts commonly keep credentials: Lambda function settings, Secrets Manager and the AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store. The attacker tested each key it found with TruffleHog against AWS, Microsoft Entra ID and Okta. Wiz says those keys belonged to the affected companies rather than to Qubole. The attacker then downloaded data from whatever Amazon S3 buckets each role could read and in some cases took a whole bucket in one session. Wiz's post does not say how many companies were affected or how the attacker obtained the Qubole credentials. Wiz separately saw customer-owned AWS keys created for Qubole integrations being tested from October 8 to 11, which it has not linked to this campaign.

2Wiz Says Allowing Only the Vendor's Networks Would Have Blocked Every Attempt It Saw

Wiz's advice starts with an inventory of every role whose trust policy allows an outside account and the deletion of roles for integrations a company no longer uses. Where the vendor supports it, Wiz recommends trusting the vendor's specific IAM principal instead of its whole account, limiting requests to the vendor's documented networks and holding each role to least privilege. It says not to rely on the External ID as the only control, because CloudTrail, the AWS activity log, records it in plaintext and vendors often store it.

In this activity, a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption we observed.

Wiz, Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild, November 9, 2026

Wiz asks vendors to take on customer roles with short-lived credentials instead of long-lived IAM user keys, because one vendor principal that every customer trusts opens all of those customers at once.

Source: Wiz, Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild, November 9, 2026.