One Prompt Exposed Every Agent in Its Region Under AWS's Old AgentCore Default
1The Default Role Covered Every Agent in the Account's Region
Companies can deploy their AI agents on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, a managed AWS platform. On October 8, 2026, the security firm Zenity Labs showed that one prompt to a single AgentCore agent could expose all the others. The attacker used a prompt injection to make an agent with a web-request tool call the instance metadata service. This local AWS endpoint hands out the temporary credentials of the agent's cloud role. By default, that role was not limited to its own agent. It held permissions over every AgentCore agent in the same account and region. Least privilege exists to close exactly that gap.
The default AgentCore role wasn't scoped to the specific agent. Instead, it included broad permissions across all AgentCore resources in the entire AWS account's region.
Tamir Ishay Sharbat and Lana Salameh, Zenity Labs
With those credentials, the researchers listed every agent in the region. They could read private conversations across agents, users and sessions and send requests to any agent, including internal ones. Zenity Labs says an attacker needed only chat access to one exposed agent. AWS says an agent can access another AWS account only if the developer grants permissions on both sides. Inside AWS, the blast radius therefore stayed within one account and region. Stolen credentials have carried an agent further before. In the JadePuffer attack reported in July, an agent used them to move through a network on its own.
2The Credential Store Was Readable by the Agent It Was Kept From
AgentCore recommends keeping an agent's credentials for MCP servers, connectors and APIs away from the agent itself. They go into AgentCore Identity and AWS Secrets Manager. AgentCore Gateway then adds them to the requests that pass through it. The default role held permission to read those secrets in Secrets Manager. In a follow-up post, the researchers used them to access services outside AWS. A gateway that holds credentials for an agent protects them only while the agent's cloud role cannot read the store that holds them.
The behavior described is documented and expected. AgentCore agents can access the credentials for their own execution role through the metadata service.
AWS, statement published by Zenity Labs
Zenity Labs reported the findings to AWS in December 2025 and January 2026. AWS told the researchers that newly deployed agents have used only the newer version of the metadata service, IMDSv2, since February 14, 2026. On September 29, 2026, the researchers found that AWS had removed the default role's region-wide permissions to run agents, read conversations and access Secrets Manager. Zenity Labs says all the issues it describes have been patched, although AWS calls the behavior documented and expected. Its post does not say whether agents deployed before these changes were updated. AWS recommends execution roles that hold only what their agents need.
Source: Tamir Ishay Sharbat and Lana Salameh, Zenity Labs, AgentCorruption: How A Single Prompt Collapsed The Entire Cloud Security Model, October 8, 2026.

